Social Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution : the POUM Hypothesis by Bénabou, Roland & Ok, Efe A.
Social Mobility
and the Demand for Redistribution:
the POUM Hypothesis1
Roland Bénabou?2 and Efe A. Ok]3
First Draft: August 1997
This version: November 1999
1We thank Abhijit Banerjee, Jess Benhabib, Ed Glaeser, Levent Koçkesen, Ignacio Ortuño–Ortin, three
anonymous referees, and seminar participants at NYU, Maryland, MIT, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Pompeu
Fabra, Princeton and Toulouse for their helpful comments.
2?Princeton University, NBER, CEPR and IRP. This paper was written while I was at the Institut
d’Economie Industrielle (IDEI–CERAS–GREMAQ) in Toulouse, and at New York University. Financial
support from the National Science Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation and the C.V. Starr Center is
gratefully acknowledged.
3]New York University. Financial support from the C.V. Starr Center is gratefully acknowledged.
Abstract
Even relatively poor people oppose high rates of redistribution because of the anticipation that
they, or their children, may make it up the income ladder. This “prospect of upward mobility”
(POUM) hypothesis is often advanced as one of the factors limiting the extent of redistribution
in democracies. But is it compatible with all voters holding rational expectations? This paper
establishes the formal basis for the POUM mechanism. There is a range of incomes below the
mean where agents oppose lasting redistributions, if (and, in a sense, only if) tomorrow’s expected
income is increasing and concave in today’s income. The coalition against more redistributive
policies is larger, the more concave the transition function, and the longer the policy horizon. We
illustrate the general analysis with an example where, in every period, 3/4 of families are poorer
than average, yet a 2/3 majority has expected future incomes above the mean, and therefore desires
low tax rates for all future generations. Using mobility matrices from the PSID, we also make a
…rst pass at an empirical assessment of the POUM mechanism. We …nd that this e¤ect is indeed
present in the data, but probably dominated by the demand for insurance.
Keywords: Social Mobility, Income Distribution, Political Economy, Inequality, Taxation.
JEL classi…cation: D31, D72, P16, H20.
“In the future, everyone will be world-famous for …fteen minutes.”
Andy Warhol (1968)
Introduction
The following argument is among those commonly advanced to explain why democracies, where
a relatively poor majority holds the political power, do not engage in large-scale expropriation and
redistribution. Even people with income below average, it is said, will not support high tax rates
because of the prospect of upward mobility: they take into account the fact that they, or their
children, may move up in the income distribution and therefore be hurt by such policies.1 For
instance, Okun (1975) relates that:
“In 1972 a storm of protest from blue–collar workers greeted Senator McGovern’s pro-
posal for con…scatory estate taxes. They apparently wanted some big prizes maintained
in the game. The silent majority did not want the yacht clubs closed forever to their
children and grandchildren while those who had already become members kept sailing
along.”
The question we ask in this paper is simple: does this story make sense with economic agents
who hold rational expectations over their income dynamics, or does it require that the poor sys-
tematically overestimate their chances of upward mobility –a form of what Marxist writers refer to
as “false consciousness”?
The “prospect of upward mobility” (POUM) hypothesis has, to the best of our knowledge, never
been formalized, which is rather surprising for such a recurrent theme in the political economy of
redistribution. There are three implicit premises behind this story. The …rst is that policies chosen
today will, to some extent, persist into future periods. Some degree of inertia or commitment power
in the setting of …scal policy seems quite reasonable. The second assumption is that agents are
not too risk–averse, for otherwise they must realize that redistribution provides valuable insurance
against the fact that their income may go down as well as up. The third and key premise is that
individuals or families who are currently poorer than average –for instance, the median voter– expect
to become richer than average. This “optimistic” view clearly cannot be true for everyone below
the mean, barring the implausible case of negative serial correlation. Moreover, a standard mean–
reverting income process would seem to imply that tomorrow’s expected income lies somewhere
between today’s income and the mean. This would leave the poor of today still poor in relative
terms tomorrow, and therefore demanders of redistribution. And even if a positive fraction of
agents below the mean today can somehow expect to be above it tomorrow, the expected incomes
1See for example Roemer (1998) or Putterman (1996). The prospect of upward mobility hypothesis is also related
to Hirschman’s (1973) famous “tunnel e¤ect,” although his argument is more about how people make inferences about
their mobility prospects from observing the experience of others. There are of course several other explanations for
the broader question of why the poor do not expropriate the rich. These include the deadweight loss from taxation
(e.g., Meltzer and Richard (1981)), and the idea that the political system is biased against the poor (Peltzman (1980),
Bénabou (2000). Putterman, Roemer, and Sylvestre (1999) provide a review.
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of those who are currently richer than them must be even higher. Does this not then require that
the number of people above the mean be forever rising over time, which cannot happen in steady–
state? It thus appears –and economists have often concluded– that the intuition behind the POUM
hypothesis is ‡awed, or at least incompatible with everyone holding realistic views of their income
prospects.2
The contribution of this paper is to formally examine the “prospect of upward mobility” hy-
pothesis, asking whether and when it can be valid. The answer turns out to be surprisingly simple,
yet a bit subtle. We show that there exists a range of incomes below the mean where agents oppose
lasting redistributions if (and, in a sense, only if) tomorrow’s expected income is an increasing and
concave function of today’s income. The more concave the transition function, and the longer the
length of time for which taxes are pre-set, the lower the demand for redistribution. Even the median
voter –in fact, even an arbitrarily poor voter– may oppose redistribution if either of these factors
is large enough. We also explain how the concavity of the expected transition function and the
skewness of idiosyncratic income shocks interact to shape the long–run distribution of income. We
construct, for instance, a simple Markov process whose steady–state distribution has three quarters
of the population below mean income, so that they would support purely contemporary redistribu-
tions. Yet when voters look ahead to the next period, two thirds of them have expected incomes
above the mean, and this super–majority will therefore oppose (perhaps through constitutional
design) any redistributive policy that bears primarily on future incomes.
Concavity of the expected transition function is a rather natural property, being simply a form of
decreasing returns: as current income rises, the odds for future income improve, but at a decreasing
rate. While this requirement is stronger than simple mean reversion or convergence of individual
incomes, concave transition functions are ubiquitous in economic models and econometric speci…-
cations. They arise for instance when current resources a¤ect investment due to credit constraints
and the accumulation technology has decreasing returns; or when some income–generating indi-
vidual characteristic, such as ability, is passed on to children according to a similar “technology”.
In particular, the speci…cation of income dynamics most widely used in theoretical and empirical
work, namely the loglinear ar(1) process, has this property.
Let us now explain the key role played by concavity in the POUM mechanism. For maximum
simplicity (but minimum realism), let agents decide today between “laissez-faire” and complete
sharing with respect to next period’s income, which is a deterministic function of current income:
y0 = f(y); for all y in some interval [0; ¹y]: Without loss of generality, normalize f so that someone
with income equal to the average, ¹, maintains that same level tomorrow (f(¹) = ¹): As shown on
Figure 1, everyone who is initially poorer will then see their income rise, and conversely all those
who are initially richer will experience a decline. The concavity of f –more speci…cally, Jensen’s
inequality– means that the losses of the rich sum to more than the gains of the poor; therefore
tomorrow’s per capita income ¹0 is below ¹: An agent with mean initial income, or even somewhat
2For instance, Putterman, Roemer, and Sylvestre (1999) state that “voting against wealth taxation to preserve the
good fortune of one’s family in the future cannot be part of a rational expectations equilibrium, unless the deadweight
loss from taxation is expected to be large or voters are risk loving over some range”.
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poorer, can thus rationally expect to be richer than average in the next period, and will therefore
oppose future redistributions.
To provide an alternative interpretation, let us now normalize the transition function so that
tomorrow’s and today’s mean incomes coincide, ¹0 = ¹: The concavity of f can then be interpreted
as saying that y0 is obtained from y through a progressive, balanced budget, redistributive scheme,
which shifts the Lorenz curve upwards and reduces the skewness of the income distribution. As
is well known, such progressivity leaves the individual with average endowment better o¤ than
under “laissez-faire”, because income is taken disproportionately from the rich. This means that
the expected income y0 of a person with initial income ¹ is strictly greater than ¹; hence greater
than the average of y0 across agents. This person, and those with initial incomes not too far below,
will therefore be hurt if future incomes are redistributed.3
Extending the model to a more realistic stochastic setting brings to light another important
element of the story, namely the skewness of idiosyncratic income shocks. The notion that life
resembles a lottery where a lucky few will “make it big” is somewhat implicit in casual descriptions of
the POUM hypothesis –such as Okun’s. But, in contrast to concavity, skewness in itself does nothing
to reduce the demand for redistribution; in particular, it clearly does not a¤ect the distribution of
expected incomes. The real role played by such idiosyncratic shocks, as we show, is to o¤set the
skewness–reducing e¤ect of concave expected transitions functions, so as to maintain a positively
skewed distribution of income realizations (especially in steady–state). The balance between the two
forces of concavity and skewness is what allows us to rationalize the apparent risk-loving behavior,
or over–optimism, of poor voters who consistently vote for low tax rates due to the slim prospects
of upward mobility.
With the important exceptions of Hirschman (1973) and Piketty (1995a, 1995b), the economic
literature on the implications of social mobility for political equilibrium and redistributive policies
is very sparse. For instance, mobility concerns are completely absent from the many papers recently
devoted to the links between income inequality, redistributive politics, and growth (e.g., Alesina
and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994)). A key mechanism in this class of models is that
of a poor median voter who chooses high tax rates or other forms of expropriation, which in turn
discourage accumulation and growth. We show that when agents vote not just on the current …scal
policy but on one that will remain in e¤ect for some time, even a poor median voter may choose a
low tax rate –independently of any deadweight loss considerations.
While sharing the same general motivation as Piketty (1995a, 1995b), our approach is quite
di¤erent. Piketty’s main concern is to explain persistent di¤erences in attitudes towards redis-
tribution. He therefore studies the inference problem of agents who care about a common social
3The concavity of f implies that f(x)=x is decreasing, which corresponds to “tax” progressivity and Lorenz
equalization, on any interval [y; ¹y] such that yf 0(y) · f(y): This clearly applies in the present case, where y = 0
and f(0) ¸ 0 since income is non–negative. Where the boundary condition does not hold, concavity is consistent
with (local or global) regressivity. At the most general level, a concave scheme is thus one that redistributes from the
extremes towards the mean. This is the economic meaning of Jensen’s inequality, given the normalization ¹0 = ¹. In
practice, however, most empirical mobility processes are clearly progressive (in expectation). The progressive case
discussed above and illustrated on Figure 1 is thus really the relevant one for conveying the key intuition.
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welfare function, but learn about the determinants of economic success only through personal or
dynastic experimentation. Because this involves costly e¤ort, they may end up with di¤erent long–
run beliefs over the incentive costs of taxation. We focus instead on agents who know the true
(stochastic) mobility process and whose main concern is to maximize the present value of their
aftertax incomes, or that of their progeny. The key determinant of their vote is therefore how they
assess their prospects for upward and downward mobility, relative to the rest of the population.
The paper will formalize the intuitions presented above linking these relative income prospects
to the concavity in the mobility process, then examine their robustness to aggregate uncertainty,
longer horizons, discounting, risk–aversion, and nonlinear taxation. It will also present an analytical
example which demonstrates how a large majority of the population can be simultaneously below
average in terms of current income and above average in terms of expected future income, even
though the income distribution remains invariant.4 Interestingly, a simulated version of this simple
model …ts some of the main features of the US income distribution and intergenerational persistence
rather well. It also suggests, on the other hand, that the POUM e¤ect can have a signi…cant impact
on the political equilibrium only if agents have relatively low degrees of risk–aversion.
Finally, the paper also makes a …rst pass at the empirical assessment of the POUM hypothesis.
Using interdecile mobility matrices from the PSID, we compute over di¤erent horizons the pro-
portion of agents who have expected future incomes above the mean. Consistent with the theory,
we …nd that this “laissez–faire” coalition grows with the length of the forecast period, to reach a
majority for a horizon of about twenty years. We also …nd, however, that these expected income
gains of the middle class are likely to be dominated, under standard values of risk–aversion, by the
desire for social insurance against the risks of downward mobility or stagnation.
1 Preliminaries
We consider an endowment economy populated by a continuum of individuals indexed by i 2 [0; 1];
whose initial levels of income lie in some interval X ´ [0; ¹y]; 0 < ¹y · 1:5 An income distribution
is de…ned as a continuous function F : X ! [0; 1] such that F (0) = 0; F (¹y) = 1 and ¹F ´
R
X y dF <
1: We shall denoted by F the class of all such distributions, and by F+ the subset of those whose
median, mF ´ F¡1(1=2); is below their mean. We shall refer to such distributions as positively
skewed, and more generally we shall measure “skewness” in a random variable as the proportion of
realizations below the mean (minus a half), rather than by the usual normalized third moment.
A redistribution scheme is de…ned as a function r : X £ F ! R+ which associates to each
pretax income and initial distribution a level a disposable income r(y;F ); while preserving total
income:
R
X r(y;F ) dF (y) = ¹F : We thus abstract from any deadweight losses which such a scheme
might realistically entail, in order to better highlight the di¤erent mechanism which is our focus.
Both represent complementary forces reducing the demand for redistribution, and could potentially
4Another analytical example is the loglinear, lognormal ar(1) process commonly used in econometric studies.
Complete closed–form solutions to the model under this speci…cation are provided in Bénabou and Ok (1998).
5More generally, the income support could be any interval [y; ¹y]; y ¸ 0: We choose y = 0 for notational simplicity.
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be combined into a common framework.
The class of redistributive schemes used in a vast majority of political economy models is that
of proportional schemes, where all incomes are taxed at the rate ¿ and the collected revenue is
redistributed in a lump-sum manner.6 We denote this class as P ´ fr¿ j 0 · ¿ · 1g, where
r¿ (y; F ) ´ (1¡¿)y+¿¹F for all y 2 X and F 2 F : We shall mostly work with just the two extreme
members of P; namely, r0 and r1: Clearly, r0 corresponds to the “laissez-faire” policy, whereas r1
corresponds to “complete equalization”.
Our focus on these two polar cases is not nearly as restrictive as might initially appear. First,
the analysis immediately extends to the comparison between any two proportional redistribution
schemes, say r¿ and r¿ 0 ; with 0 · ¿ < ¿ 0 · 1: Second, r0 and r1 are in a certain sense “focal”
members of P since, in the simplest framework where one abstracts from taxes’ distortionary e¤ects
as well as their insurance value, these are the only candidates in this class that can be Condorcet
winners. In particular, for any distribution with median income below the mean, r1 beats every
other linear scheme under majority voting if agents care only about their current disposable income.
We shall see that this conclusion may be dramatically altered when individuals’ voting behavior
also incorporates concerns about their future incomes. Finally, in Section 4 we shall extend the
analysis to nonlinear (progressive or regressive) schemes, and show that our main results remain
valid.
As pointed out earlier, mobility considerations can enter into voter preferences only if current
policy has lasting e¤ects. Such persistence is quite plausible given the many sources of inertia and
status quo bias that characterize the policy–making process, especially in an uncertain environment.
These include constitutional limits on the frequency of tax changes, the costs of forming new
coalitions and passing new legislation, the potential for prolonged gridlock, and the advantage of
incumbent candidates and parties in electoral competitions. We shall therefore take such persistence
as given, and formalize it by assuming that tax policy must be set one period in advance, or more
generally preset for T periods. We will then study how the length of this commitment period a¤ects
the demand for redistribution.7
The third and key feature of the economy is the mobility process. We shall study economies
where individual incomes or endowments yit evolve according to a law of motion of the form
yit+1 = f(y
i
t; µ
i
t+1); t = 0; :::; T ¡ 1; (1)
6See, for instance, Meltzer and Richard (1981), Persson and Tabellini (1991), or Alesina and Rodrik (1994).
Proportional schemes reduce the voting problem to a single-dimensional one, thereby allowing the use of the median
voter theorem. By contrast, when unrestricted nonlinear redistributive schemes are allowed there is generally no
voting equilibrium (in pure strategies): the core of the voting game is empty.
7Another possible channel through which current tax decisions might incorporate concerns about future redistri-
butions is if voters try to in‡uence future political outcomes by a¤ecting the evolution of the income distribution,
through the current tax rate. This strategic voting idea has little to do with the POUM hypothesis as discussed in
the literature (see references in footnote 1, as well as Okun’s citation). Moreover, these dynamic voting games are
notoriously intractable, so the nearly universal practice in political economy models is to assume “myopic” voters.
In our model the issue does not even arise since we focus on endowment economies, where income dynamics are
exogenous.
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where f is a stochastic transition function and µit+1 is the realization of a random shock £it+1:8
We require this stochastic process to have the following properties:
(i) The random variables £it, (i; t) 2 [0; 1] £ f1; : : : ; Tg; have a common probability distribution
function P; with support -:
(ii) The function f : X £- ! X is continuous, with a well–de…ned expectation E£[f( ;£)] on X:
(iii) Future income increases with current income, in the sense of …rst–order stochastic dominance:
for any (y; y0) 2 X2; the conditional distribution M(y0j y) ´ Prob(fµ 2 - j f(y; µ) · y0g) is
decreasing in y; with strict monotonicity on some non–empty interval in X:
The …rst condition means that everyone faces the same uncertain environment, which is sta-
tionary across periods. Put di¤erently, current income is the only individual-level state variable
which helps predict future income. While this focus on unidimensional processes follows a long
tradition in the study of socioeconomic mobility (e.g., Atkinson (1983), Shorrocks (1978), Conlisk
(1990), Dardanoni (1993)), one should be aware that it is fairly restrictive, especially in an intra-
generational context. It means for instance that one abstracts from life–cycle earnings pro…les and
other sources of lasting heterogeneity such as gender, race, or occupation, which would introduce
additional state variables into the income dynamics. This becomes less of a concern when dealing
with intergenerational mobility, where one can essentially think of the two–period case, T = 1; as
representing overlapping generations. Note, …nally, that condition (i) puts no restriction on the
correlation of shocks across individuals: it allows for purely aggregate shocks (£it = £
j
t for all i; j
in [0; 1]), purely idiosyncratic shocks (the £it’s are independent across agents and sum to zero), and
all cases in between.9
The second condition is a minor technical requirement. The third condition implies that ex-
pected income E£[f(¢ ;£)] rises with current income, which is what we shall actually use in the
results. We impose the stronger distributional monotonicity for realism, as all empirical studies of
mobility (intra or intergenerational) …nd income to be positively serially correlated and transition
matrices to be monotone. Thus, given the admittedly restrictive assumption (i), (ii) is a natural
requirement to impose.
We shall initially focus the analysis on deterministic income dynamics (where µit is just a con-
stant, and therefore dropped from the notation), then incorporate random shocks. While the
stochastic case is obviously of primary interest, the deterministic one makes the key intuitions
more transparent, and provides useful intermediate results. This two–step approach will also help
highlight the fundamental dichotomy between the roles of concavity in expectations and skewness
in realizations.
8We thus consider only endowment economies, but the POUM mechanism remains operative when agents make
e¤ort and investment decisions, and the transition function varies endogenously with the chosen redistributive policies.
Bénabou (1999, 2000) develops such a model, using speci…c functional and distributional assumptions.
9Throughout the paper we shall follow the common practice of ignoring the subtle mathematical problems in-
volved with continua of independent random variables, and thus treat each £it as jointly measurable in i, for any t:
Consequently, the law of large numbers and Fubini’s theorem are applied as usual.
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2 Income Dynamics and Voting under Certainty
It is thus assumed for now that individual pre-tax incomes or endowments evolve according to a
deterministic transition function f; which is continuous and strictly increasing. The income stream
of an individual with initial endowment y 2 X is then y; f(y); f2(y); : : : ;
f t(y); : : : ; and for any initial F 2 F the cross–sectional distribution of incomes in period t is
Ft ´ F ± f¡t: A particularly interesting class of transition functions for the purposes of this paper
is the set of all concave (but not a¢ne) transition functions; we denote this set by T :
2.1 Two-Period Analysis
To distill our main argument to its most elementary form, we focus …rst on a two-period (or overlap-
ping generations) scenario, where individuals vote “today” (date 0) over alternative redistribution
schemes which will be enacted only “tomorrow” (date 1). For instance, the predominant motive
behind agents’ voting behavior could be the well-being of their o¤spring, who will be subject to
the tax policy designed by the current generation. Accordingly, agent y 2 X votes for r1 over r0
if she expects her period one earnings to be below the per capita average:
f(y) <
Z
X
f dF0 = ¹F1 : (2)
Suppose now that f 2 T , that is, it is concave but not a¢ne. Then, by Jensen’s inequality,
f(¹F0) = f
µZ
X
y dF0
¶
>
Z
X
f dF0 = ¹F1; (3)
so the agent with average income at date zero will oppose date one redistributions. On the other
hand, it is clear that f(0) < ¹F1; so there must exist a unique y
¤
f in (0; ¹F0) such that f(y
¤
f ) ´ ¹F1 :
Of course y¤f = f¡1(¹F0±f¡1) also depends on F0 but, for brevity, we do not make this dependence
explicit in the notation. Since f is strictly increasing, it is clear that y¤f acts as a tipping point
in agents’ attitudes towards redistributions bearing on future income. Moreover, since Jensen’s
inequality –with respect to all distributions F0– characterizes concavity, the latter is both neces-
sary and su¢cient for the “prospect of upward mobility” hypothesis to be valid, under any linear
redistribution scheme.10
Proposition 1 The following two properties of a transition function f are equivalent:
(a) f is concave (but not a¢ne), i.e. f 2 T :
(b) For any income distribution F0 2 F there exists a unique y¤f < ¹F0 such that all agents in
[0; y¤f ) vote for r1 over r0; while all those in (y¤f ; ¹y] vote for r0 over r1:
10For any r¿ and r¿ 0 in P such that 0 · ¿ < ¿ 0 · 1; agent y 2 X votes for r¿0 over r¿ i¤ (1 ¡ ¿ )f(y) + ¿¹F1 <
(1¡ ¿ 0)f(y) + ¿ 0¹F1 ; which in turn holds i¤ (2) holds. Thus, as noted earlier, nothing is lost by focusing only on the
two extreme schemes in P; namely r0 and r1:
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Yet another way of stating the result is that f 2 T if it is skewness–reducing: for any initial F0;
next period’s distribution F1 = F0 ±f¡1 is such that F1(¹F1) < F0(¹F0): Compared to the standard
case where individuals base their votes solely on how taxation a¤ects their current disposable
income, popular support for redistribution thus falls by a measure F0(¹F0) ¡ F1(¹F1) = F0(¹F0) ¡
F0(y¤f ) > 0: The underlying intuition also suggests that the more concave is the transition function,
the fewer people should vote for redistribution. This simple result will turn out to be very useful
in establishing some of our main propositions on the outcome of majority voting and on the e¤ect
of longer political horizons.
We shall say that f 2 T is more concave than g 2 T , and write f Â g; if and only if f is
obtained from g through an increasing and concave (not a¢ne) transformation, that is, if there
exists an h 2 T such that f = h ± g. Put di¤erently, f Â g if and only if f ± g¡1 2 T :
Proposition 2 Let F0 2 F and f; g 2 T . Then f Â g implies that y¤f < y¤g :
The underlying intuition is, again, straightforward: the demand for future …scal redistribution
is lower under the transition process which reduces skewness by more. Can prospects of upward
mobility be favorable enough for r0 to beat r1 under majority voting? Clearly, the outcome of
the election depends on the particular characteristics of f and F0: One can show, however, that
for any given pre-tax income distribution F0 there exists a transition function f which is “concave
enough” that a majority of voters choose “laissez-faire” over redistribution.11 When combined
with Proposition 2 it allows us to show the following, more general result.
Theorem 1 For any F0 2 F+, there exists an f 2 T such that r0 beats r1 under pairwise majority
voting for all transition functions that are more concave than f; and r1 beats r0 for all transition
functions that are less concave than f:
This result is subject to an obvious caveat, however: for a majority of individuals to vote for
“laissez-faire” at date zero, the transition function must be su¢ciently concave to make the date one
income distribution F1 negatively skewed. Indeed, if y¤f = f¡1(¹F1) < mF0; then ¹F1 < f(mF0) =
mF1 : There are two reasons why this is far less problematic than might initially appear. First
and foremost, it simply re‡ects the fact that we are momentarily abstracting from idiosyncratic
shocks, which typically contribute to reestablishing positive skewness. Section 3 will thus present
a stochastic version of Theorem 1 where F1 can remain as skewed as one desires. Second, it may
in fact not be necessary that the cuto¤ y¤f fall all the way below the median for redistribution
to be defeated. Even in the most developed democracies it is empirically well documented that
poor individuals have lower propensities to vote, contribute to political campaigns, and otherwise
participate in the political process, than rich ones. The general message of our results can then
11 In this case, r0 is the unique Condorcet winner in P: Note also that Theorem 1 –like every other result in the
paper concerning median income mF0– holds in fact for any arbitrary income cuto¤ below ¹F0 (see the proof in the
appendix).
8
be stated as follows: the more concave the transition function, the smaller the departure from the
“one person, one vote” ideal needs to be for redistributive policies, or parties advocating them, to
be defeated.
2.2 Multi-Period Redistributions
In this section we examine how the length of the horizon over which taxes are set and mobility
prospects evaluated a¤ects the political support for redistribution. We thus make the more realistic
assumption that the tax scheme chosen at date zero will remain in e¤ect during periods t = 0; : : : ; T;
and that agents care about the present value of their disposable income stream over this entire
horizon. Given a transition function f and a discount factor ± 2 (0; 1]; agent y 2 X votes for
“laissez–faire” over “complete equalization” if
TX
t=0
±tf t(y) >
TX
t=0
±t¹Ft ; (4)
where we recall that f t denotes the t-th iterate of f and Ft ´ F0 ± f¡t is the period t income
distribution, with mean ¹Ft :
We shall see that there again exists a unique tipping point y¤f (T ) such that all agents with initial
income less than y¤f (T ) vote for r1; while all those richer than y¤f (T ) vote for r0: When the policy
has no lasting e¤ects, this point coincides with the mean: y¤f (0) = ¹F0. When future incomes are
factored in, the coalition in favor of “laissez-faire” expands: y¤f (T ) < ¹F0 for T ¸ 1: In fact, the
more farsighted voters are, or the longer the duration of the proposed tax scheme, the less support
for redistribution there will be: y¤f (T ) is strictly decreasing in T: If agents care enough about future
incomes, the increase in the vote for r0 can be enough to ensure its victory over r1:
Theorem 2 Let F 2 F+ and ± 2 (0; 1]:
(a) For all f 2 T ; the longer is the horizon T , the larger is the share of the votes that go to r0:
(b) For all ± and T large enough, there exists an f 2 T such that r0 ties with r1 under pairwise
majority voting. Moreover, r0 beats r1 if the duration of the redistribution scheme is extended
beyond T , and is beaten by r1 if this duration is reduced below T:
Simply put, longer horizons magnify the strength of the “prospect of upward mobility” e¤ect,
whereas discounting works in the opposite direction. The intuition is very simple, and related to
Proposition 2: when forecasting incomes further into the future the one–step transition f gets com-
pounded into f2; : : : ; fT ; etc., and each of these functions is more concave than its predecessor.12
12The reason why ± and T must be large enough in part (b) of Theorem 2 is that redistribution is now assumed
to be implemented right away, starting in period 0: If it takes e¤ect only in period 1; as in the previous section, the
results apply for all ± and T ¸ 1:
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3 Income Dynamics and Voting under Uncertainty
The assumption that individuals know their future incomes with certainty is obviously unrealistic.
Moreover, in the absence of idiosyncratic shocks the cross-sectional distribution becomes more equal
over time, and eventually converges to a single mass-point. In this section we therefore extend the
analysis to the stochastic case, while maintaining risk–neutrality. The role of insurance will be
considered later on.
Income dynamics are now governed by a stochastic process yit+1 = f(y
i
t; µ
i
t+1) satisfying the basic
requirements (i)–(iii) discussed in Section 1, namely stationarity, continuity and monotonicity. In
the deterministic case the validity of the POUM conjecture was seen to hinge upon the concavity
of the transition function. The most strict extension of this property to the stochastic case is that
it should hold with probability one. Let therefore TP be the set of transition functions such that
Prob[fµ j f(¢ ; µ) 2 T g] = 1: It is clear that, for any f in TP :
(iv) The expectation E£[f(¢ ;£)] is concave (but not a¢ne) on X.
For some of our purposes the requirement that f 2 TP will be too strong, so we shall develop our
analysis for the larger set of mobility processes which simply satisfy concavity in expectation. We
shall denote as T ¤P the set of transition functions which satisfy conditions (i) to (iv).
3.1 Two-Period Analysis
We …rst return to the basic case where risk–neutral agents vote in period 0 over distributing period
1 incomes. Agent yi 2 X then prefers r0 to r1 if and only if
E£i
£
f(yi;£i)
¤
> E
£
¹F1
¤
; (5)
where the subscript £i on the left–hand side indicates that the expectation is taken only with respect
to £i; for given yi: When shocks are purely idiosyncratic, the future mean ¹F1 is deterministic due
to the law of large numbers; with aggregate shocks it remains random. In any case, the expected
mean income at date one is the mean expected income across individuals:
E
£
¹F1
¤
= E
·Z 1
0
f(yj ; £j)dj
¸
=
Z 1
0
E[f(yj ;£j)] dj =
Z
X
E£i
£
f(y ;£i)
¤
dF0(y);
by Fubini’s theorem. This is less than the expected income of an agent whose initial endowment is
equal to the mean level ¹F0 , whenever f(y; µ) – or, more generally, E£i [f(y;£
i)] – is concave in y :Z
X
E£i
£
f(y ; £i)
¤
dF0(y) < E£i
£
f(¹F0; £
i)
¤
: (6)
Consequently, there must again exist a nonempty interval [y¤f ; ¹F0 ] of incomes in which agents will
oppose redistribution, with the cuto¤ y¤f de…ned by
10
E£i
£
f(y¤f ; £i)
¤
= E
£
¹F1
¤
:
The basic POUM result thus holds for risk–neutral agents whose incomes evolve stochastically.
To examine whether an appropriate form of concavity still a¤ects the cuto¤ monotonically, and
whether enough of it can still cause r0 to beat r1 under majority voting, observe that the inequality
in (6) involves only the expected transition function E£i [f(y; £i)]; rather than f itself. This leads
us to replace the “more concave than” relation with a “more concave in expectation than” relation.
Given any probability distribution P; we de…ne this ordering on the class T ¤P as
f ÂP g if and only if E£[f(¢ ; £)] Â E£[g(¢ ;£)];
where £ is any random variable with distribution P:13 It is easily shown that f ÂP g implies y¤f < y¤g :
In fact, making f concave enough in expectation will, as before, drive the cuto¤ y¤f below the median
mF0 ; or even below any chosen income level. Most importantly, since this condition bears only on
the mean of the random function f(¢ ;£); it puts essentially no restriction on the skewness of the
period 1 income distribution F1; in sharp contrast to what occurred in the deterministic case. In
particular, a su¢ciently skewed distribution of shocks will ensure that F1 2 F+ without a¤ecting
the cuto¤ y¤f : This dichotomy between expectations and realizations is the second key component of
the POUM mechanism, and allows us to establish a stochastic generalization of Theorem 1.14
Theorem 3 For any F0 2 F+ and any ¾ 2 (0; 1); there exists a mobility process (f; P ) with f 2 T ¤P
such that F1(¹F1) ¸ ¾ and, under pairwise majority voting, r0 beats r1 for all transition functions
in T ¤P that are more concave than f in expectation, while r1 beats r0 for all those that are less
concave than f in expectation.
Thus, once random shocks are incorporated we reach essentially the same conclusions as in
Section 2, but with much greater realism. Concavity of E£[f(¢ ;£)] is necessary and su¢cient for
the political support behind the “laissez-faire” policy to increase when individuals’ voting behavior
takes into account their future income prospects. If f is concave enough in expectation, then r0
can even be the preferred policy of a majority of voters.
13 Interestingly, Â and ÂP are logically independent orderings. Even if there exists some h 2 T such that f(¢; µ) =
h(g(¢; µ)) for all µ; it need not be that f ÂP g:
14The simplest case where the distribution of expectations and the distribution of realizations di¤er is that of a
lottery. The …rst distribution reduces to a single mass-point (everyone has the same expected payo¤), whereas the
second is extremely unequal (there is only one winner). Note, however, that this income process does not have the
POUM property (instead, everyone’s expected income coincides with the mean), precisely because it is not concave.
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3.2 Steady–State Distributions
The presence of idiosyncratic uncertainty is not only realistic, but is also required to ensure a
non–degenerate long–run income distribution. This, in turn, is essential to show that our previous
…ndings describe not just transitory, short-run e¤ects, but stable, permanent ones as well.
Let P be a probability distribution of idiosyncratic shocks and f a transition function in T ¤P .
An invariant or steady–state distribution of this stochastic process is an F 2 F (not necessarily
positively skewed) such that
F (y) =
Z
-
Z
X
1ff(x;µ)·yg dF (x) dP (µ) for all y 2 X;
where 1f¢g denotes the indicator function. Since the basic result that the coalition opposed to
lasting redistributions includes agents poorer than the mean holds for all distributions in F , it
applies to invariant ones in particular: thus y¤f < ¹F :15
This brings us back to the puzzle mentioned in the introduction. How can there be a stationary
distribution F where a positive fraction of agents below the mean ¹F have expected incomes greater
than ¹F ; as do all those who start above this mean, given that the number of people on either side
of ¹F must remain invariant over time?
The answer is that even though everyone makes unbiased forecasts, the number of agents with
expected income above the mean, 1¡F (y¤f;F ); strictly exceeds the number who actually end up with
realized incomes above the mean, 1 ¡ F (¹F ); whenever f is concave in expectation. This result
is apparent on Figure 2, which provides additional intuition by plotting each agent’s expected
income path over future dates, E
£
yit j yi0
¤
: In the long run everyone’s expected income converges
to the population mean ¹F ; but this convergence is non–monotonic for all initial endowments in
some interval (yF ; ¹yF ) around ¹F : In particular, for y
i
0 2 (yF ; ¹F ) expected income …rst crosses the
mean from below, then converges back to it from above. While such non-monotonicity may seem
surprising at …rst, it follows from our results that all concave (expected) transition functions must
have this feature.
This still leaves us with one of the most interesting questions: can one …nd income processes
whose stationary distribution is positively skewed, but where a strict majority of the population
nonetheless opposes redistribution? The answer is a¢rmative, as we shall demonstrate through a
simple Markovian example. Let income take one of three values: X = fa1; a2; a3g; with a1 < a2 <
a3: The transition probabilities between these states are independent across agents, and given by
15 If the inequality y¤f < ¹F is required to hold only for the steady–state distribution(s) F induced by f and P;
rather than for all initial distributions, concavity of E£[f(¢; £)] is still a su¢cient condition, but no longer a necessary
one. Nonetheless, some form of concavity “on average” is still required, so to speak: if E£[f(¢; £)] were linear or
convex, we would have y¤f ¸ ¹F for all distributions, including stationary ones.
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the Markov matrix:
M =
264 1 ¡ r r 0ps 1 ¡ s (1 ¡ p)s
0 q 1 ¡ q
375 ; (7)
where (p; q; r; s) 2 (0; 1)4. The invariant distribution induced by M over fa1; a2; a3g is found by
solving ¼M = ¼: It will be denoted by ¼ = (¼1; ¼2; ¼3); with mean ¹ ´ ¼1a1+¼2a2+(1¡¼1¡¼2)a3.
We require that the mobility process and associated steady–state satisfy the following conditions:
(a) Next period’s income yit+1is stochastically increasing in current income yit; 16
(b) The median income level is a2 : ¼1 < 1=2 < ¼1 + ¼2;
(c) The median agent is poorer than the mean: a2 < ¹;
(d) The median agent has expected income above the mean: E
£
yit+1 j yit = a2
¤
> ¹:
Conditions (b) and (c) together ensure that a strict majority of the population would vote for
current redistribution, while (b) and (d) together imply that a strict majority will vote against future
redistribution. In Bénabou and Ok (1998) we provide su¢cient conditions on (p; q; r; s;a1; a2; a3) for
(a)–(d) to be satis…ed, and show them to hold for a wide set of parameters. In the steady–state
of such an economy the distribution of expected incomes is negatively skewed, even though the
distribution of actual incomes remains positively skewed and every one has rational expectations.
Granted that such income processes exist, one might still ask: are they at all empirically
plausible? We shall present two speci…cations which match the broad facts of the US income
distribution and intergenerational persistence reasonably well. First, let p = :55, q = :6, r = :5,
and s = :7; leading to the transition matrix
M =
264 : 5 : 5 0: 385 : 3 : 315
0 : 6 : 4
375
and the stationary distribution (¼1; ¼2; ¼3) = (:33; :44; :23): Thus, 77% of the population is always
poorer than average, yet 67% always have expected income above average. In each period, however,
only 23% actually end up with realized incomes above the mean, thus replicating the invariant
distribution. Choosing (a1; a2; a3) = (16000; 36000; 91000); we obtain a rather good …t with the
data, especially in light of the model’s extreme simplicity; see Table 1, columns 1 and 2. This
income process also has more persistence for the lower and upper income groups than for the
middle class, which is consistent with the …ndings of Cooper, Durlauf and Johnson (1994). But
most striking is its main political implication: a two–thirds majority of voters will support a policy
or constitution designed to implement a zero tax rate for all future generations, even though:
16Put di¤erently, we posit that M = [mkl]3£3 is a monotone transition matrix, requiring row k+1 to stochastically
dominate row k : m11 ¸ m21 ¸ m31 and m11 + m12 ¸ m21 +m22 ¸ m31 + m32: Monotone Markov chains were
introduced by Keilson and Ketser (1977), and applied to the analysis of income mobility by Conlisk (1990) and
Dardanoni (1993).
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– no deadweight loss concern enters into voters’ calculations;
– three quarters of the population is always poorer than average;
– the pivotal middle class, which accounts for most of the “laissez–faire” coalition, knows that
its children have less than a one in three chance of “making it” into the upper class. .
The last column of Table 1 presents the results for a slightly di¤erent speci…cation, which
also does a good job of matching the key features of the data, and which we shall use later on
when studying the e¤ects of risk–aversion. With (p; q; r; s) = (:45; :6; :3; :7), and (a1; a2; a3) =
(20000; 35000; 90000), the transition matrix is now
M =
264 : 7 : 3 0: 315 : 3 : 385
0 : 6 : 4
375 ;
and the invariant distribution is (¼1; ¼2; ¼3) = (:39; :37; :24): The majority opposing future redistri-
butions is a bit lower, but still 61%: Middle class children now have about a 40% chance of upward
mobility, and this will make a di¤erence when we introduce risk–aversion later on. Note that
the source of these greater expected income gains is increased concavity in the transition process,
relative to the …rst speci…cation.
3.3 Multi–Period Redistributions
We now extend the analysis of the general model to multi–period redistributions under uncertainty,
maintaining the assumption of risk–neutrality (or complete markets). Agents thus care about the
expected present value of their net income over the T + 1 periods during which the chosen tax
scheme is to remain in place. For any individual i; we denote by £it ´ (£i1; :::; £it) the random
sequence of shocks which she receives up to date t; and by µit ´ (µi1; :::; µit) a sample realization.
Given a one–step transition function f 2 TP , her income in period t is:
yit = f(:::; f(f(y
i
0; µ
i
1); µ
i
2); :::; µ
i
t) ´ f t(yi0; µit); t = 1; :::; T; (8)
where f t(yi0; µ
i
t) now denotes the t¡step transition function. Under “laissez-faire,” the expected
present value of this income stream over the political horizon is
V T (yi0) ´ E£1 ¢ ¢ ¢E£T
"
TX
t=0
±tyit j yi0
#
=
TX
t=0
±tE£itf
t(y; £it) =
TX
t=0
±tE£itf
t(y;£it);
where we suppressed the index i on the random variables £it since they all have the same probability
distribution P t(µt) ´ Qtk=1 P (µk) on -t: Under the policy r1; on the other hand, agent i’s expected
income at each t is the expected mean E£t
£
¹Ft
¤
, which by Fubini’s theorem is also the mean
expected income. The resulting payo¤ is
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TX
t=0
±tE[¹Ft ] =
TX
t=0
±t
µZ 1
0
E£jt
h
f t(yj0;£
j
t)
i
dj
¶
=
TX
t=0
±t
Z
X
E£t
£
f t(y; £t)
¤
dF0(y) ;
so that agent i votes for r1 over r0 if and only if
V T (yi0) >
Z
X
V T (y) dF0(y): (9)
It is easily veri…ed that for transition functions which are concave (but not a¢ne) in y with prob-
ability one, that is, for f 2 TP , every function f t(y; µit); t ¸ 1, inherits this property. Naturally, so
do the weighted average
PT
t=0 ±
tf t(y; µit) and its expectation V T (y); for T ¸ 1: Hence, in this quite
general setup, the now familiar result:
Proposition 3 Let F0 2 F , ± 2 (0; 1]; T ¸ 1: For any mobility process (f; P ) with f 2 TP , there
exists a unique y¤f (T ) < ¹F0 such that all agents in [0; y¤f (T )) vote for r1 over r0; while all those in
(y¤f (T ); 1] vote for r0 over r1:
Note that Proposition 3 does not cover the larger class of transition processes T ¤P de…ned earlier,
since V T (y) need not be concave if f is only concave in expectation. Can one obtain a stronger
result, similar to that of the deterministic case, namely that the tipping point decreases as the
horizon lengthens? While this seems quite intuitive, and will indeed occur in the data analyzed
in Section 5, it may in fact not hold without relatively strong additional assumptions. The reason
is that the expectation operator does not, in general, preserve the “more concave than” relation.
A su¢cient condition which insures this result is that the t + 1–step transition function be more
concave in expectation than the t–step transition function.
Proposition 4 Let F0 2 F, ± 2 (0; 1]; T ¸ 1; and let (f; P ) be a mobility process with f 2 T ¤P . If,
for all t; f t+1(¢ ;£t+1) ÂP t+1 f t(¢ ; £t); that is,
E£1 ¢ ¢ ¢E£t+1
£
f t+1(¢ ; £1; :::; £t+1)¤ Â E£1¢ ¢ ¢E£t £f t(¢ ;£1; :::; £t)¤ ;
then the larger the political horizon T; the larger the share of the votes that go to r0:
The interpretation is the same as that of Theorem 2(a): the more forward–looking the voters,
or the more long–lived the tax scheme, the lower is the political support for redistribution. An
immediate corollary is that this monotonicity holds when the transition function is of the form
f(y; µ) = y®Á(µ); where ® 2 (0; 1) and Á can be an arbitrary function. This is the familiar loglinear
model of income mobility, ln yit+1 = ® ln yit+ln "it+1, which is widely used in the empirical literature.
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4 Extending the Basic Framework
4.1 Risk–Aversion
When agents are risk-averse, the fact that redistributive policies provide insurance against idiosyn-
cratic shocks increases their attractiveness, hence the breadth of their political support. Conse-
quently, the cuto¤ separating those who vote for r0 from those who prefer r1 may be above or below
the mean, depending on the relative strength of the “prospect of mobility” and the risk–aversion
e¤ects. While the tension between these two forces is very intuitive, no general characterization of
the cuto¤ in terms of the relative concavity of the transition and utility functions can be provided.
To understand why, consider again the simplest setup where agents vote at date 0 over the tax
scheme for date 1: Denoting by U their utility function, the cuto¤ falls below the mean if
E£U (f (EF0 [y]; £)) > U (E£EF0 [f(y; µ)]) ;
where EF0 [y] = ¹F0 denotes the expectation with respect to the initial distribution F0: Observe that
f(¢; µ) 2 T if and only if the left hand side is greater (for all U and P ) than E£ [U (EF0 [f(y; £)])] :
But the concavity of U , namely risk-aversion, is equivalent to the fact that this latter expression is
also smaller than the right hand side of the above inequality. The curvatures of the transition and
utility functions clearly work in opposite directions, but the cuto¤ is not determined by any simple
composite of the two.17
One can, on the other hand, assess the outcome of this “battle of the curvatures” quantitatively.
To that e¤ect, let us return to the simulations of the Markovian model reported in Table 1, and
ask the following question: how risk averse can the agents with median income a2 be, and still
vote against redistribution of future incomes based on the prospects of upward mobility? Assuming
CRRA preferences and comparing expected utilities under r0 and r1; we …nd that the maximum
degree of risk–aversion is only 0:35 under the speci…cation of column 2, but rises to 1 under that of
column 3. The second number is well within the range of plausible estimates, albeit still somewhat
on the low side.18 While the results from such a simple model need to be interpreted with caution,
these numbers do suggest that, with empirically plausible income processes, the POUM mechanism
will sustain only moderate degrees of risk aversion. The underlying intuition is simple: to o¤set
risk–aversion, the expected income gain from the POUM mechanism has to be larger, which means
that the expected transition function must be more concave. In order to maintain a realistic
invariant distribution, the skewed idiosyncratic shocks must then be more important, which is of
course disliked by risk–averse voters.
17One case where complete closed–form results can be obtained is for the loglinear speci…cation with lognormal
shocks; see Bénabou and Ok (1998).
18Conventional macroeconomic estimates and values used in calibrated models range from :5 to 4, but most cluster
between :5 and 2. In a recent detailed study of the income and consumption pro…les of di¤erent education and
occupation groups, Gourinchas and Parker (1999) estimate risk aversion to lie between 0:5 and 1:0:
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4.2 Non-Linear Taxation
Our analysis so far has mostly focussed on an all-or-nothing policy decision, but we explained
earlier that it immediately extends to the comparison of any two linear redistribution schemes. We
also provided results on voting equilibrium within this class of linear policies. In practice, however,
…scal policy often involves progressivity in taxes and bene…ts, and thus departs from linearity. In
this subsection we shall therefore extend the model to the comparison of arbitrary progressive and
regressive schemes, and demonstrate that our main conclusions remain essentially unchanged.
When departing from linear taxation (and before mobility considerations are even introduced),
one is inevitably confronted with the nonexistence of a voting equilibrium in a multidimensional
policy space. Even the simplest cases are subject to this well known problem. For instance, if
the policy space is that of piecewise linear, balanced schemes with just two tax brackets (which
has dimension three), there is never a Condorcet winner. Even if one restricts the dimensionality
further by imposing a zero tax rate for the …rst bracket, which then corresponds to an exemption,
the problem remains: there exist many (positively skewed) distributions for which there is no
equilibrium.
One can still, however, restrict voters to a binary policy choice (e.g., a new policy proposal versus
the status quo), and derive results on pairwise contests between alternative nonlinear schemes. This
is consistent with our earlier focus on pairwise contests between linear schemes, and will most clearly
demonstrate the main new insights. In particular, we will show how Marhuenda and Ortuño-Ortin’s
(1995) result for the static case may be reversed once mobility prospects are taken into account.
Recall that a general redistribution scheme was de…ned as a mapping r : X £ F ! R+ which
preserves total income. In what follows we shall take the economy’s initial income distribution
as given, and denote disposable income r(y;F ) as simply r(y): A redistribution scheme r can
then equivalently be speci…ed by means of a tax function T : X ! R, with collected revenueR
X T (y)dF rebated lump-sum to all agent and the normalization T (0) ´ 0 imposed without loss
of generality. Thus:
r(y) = y ¡ T (y) +
Z
X
T (y)dF; for all y 2 X: (10)
We shall con…ne our attention to redistribution schemes with the following standard properties: T
and r are increasing and continuous on X; with
R
X T dF ¸ 0 and r ¸ 0: We shall say that such
a redistribution scheme is progressive (resp. regressive) if its associated tax function is convex
(resp. concave).19
To analyze how non-linear taxation interacts with the POUM mechanism, we maintain the
simple two-period setup of Sections 2.1 and 3.1, and consider voters faced with the choice between
a progressive redistribution scheme and a regressive one (which could be laissez–faire). The key
question is then whether political support for the progressive scheme is lower when the proposed
19Recall that with T (0) = 0; if T is convex then T (x)=x is decreasing, while if T is concave then T (x)=x is increasing.
Thus progressivity/regressivity is both marginal (which is what will be used in the results) and in the average sense.
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policies are to be enacted next period, rather than in the current one. We shall show that the
answer is positive, provided the transition function f is concave enough relative to the curvature
of the proposed (net) redistributive policy.
To be more precise, let rprog and rreg be any progressive and regressive redistribution schemes,
with associated tax functions Treg and Tprog. Let F0 denote the initial income distribution, and
yF0 the income level where agents are indi¤erent between implementing rreg or rprog today. Given
a mobility process f 2 TP let y¤f denote, as before, the income level where agents are indi¤erent
between implementing rreg or rprog next period. The basic POUM hypothesis is that y¤f < yF0 ;
so that expectations of mobility reduce the political support for the more redistributive policy by
F0(yF0) ¡ F0(y¤f ): We shall establish two propositions which provide su¢cient conditions for an
even stronger result, namely yF0 ¸ ¹F0 > y¤f :20 In other words, whereas the coalition favoring
progressivity in current …scal policy extends to agents even richer than the mean (Marhuenda and
Ortuño–Ortin (1995)), the coalition opposing progressivity in future …scal policy extends to agents
even poorer than the mean.
The …rst proposition places no restrictions on F0 but focuses on the case where the progressive
scheme Tprog involves (weakly) higher tax rates than Treg at every income level. In particular, it
raises more total revenue.
Proposition 5 Let F0 2 F ; let (f; P ) be a mobility process with f 2 T ¤P , and let Tprog, Treg be
progressive and regressive tax schemes with T 0prog(0) ¸ T 0reg(0): If
E£ [(Tprog ¡ Treg)(f(y; £))] is concave (not a¢ne),
the political cuto¤s for current and future redistributions are such that yF0 ¸ ¹F0 > y¤f :
Note that Tprog¡Treg is a convex function, so the key requirement is that f be concave enough, on
average, to dominate this curvature. The economic interpretation is straightforward: the di¤erential
in an agent’s (or her child’s) future expected tax bill must be concave in her current income.
Given the other assumptions, the boundary condition T 0prog(0) ¸ T 0reg(0) implies that the tax
di¤erential Tprog ¡ Treg is always positive and increases with pretax income. This requirement is
always satis…ed when Treg ´ 0; which corresponds to the laissez-faire policy. On the other hand, it
may be too strong if the regressive policy taxes the poor more heavily. It is dropped in the next
proposition, which focuses on economies in steady–state and tax schemes that raise equal revenues.
Proposition 6 Let (f; P ) be a mobility process with f 2 T ¤P ; and denote by F the resulting steady–
state income distribution. Let Tprog and Treg be progressive and regressive tax schemes raising the
same amount of steady–state revenue:
R
X Tprog dF =
R
X Treg dF . If
E£ [(Tprog ¡ Treg)(f(y; £))] is concave (not a¢ne)
20The …rst inequality is strict unless Treg¡ Tprog happens to be linear. The above discussion implicitly assumes
that voter preferences satisfy a single–crossing condition, so that yF0 and y
¤
f exist and are indeed tipping points. Such
will be the case in our formal analysis.
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with E£ [(Tprog ¡ Treg)(f(¹y; £))] ¸ 0; then the political cuto¤s for current and future redistributions
are such that yF ¸ ¹F > y¤f :
The concavity requirement and its economic interpretation are the same as above. The boundary
condition now simply states that agents close to the maximum income ¹y face a higher expected
future tax bill under Tprog than under Treg. This requirement is both quite weak and very intuitive.
Propositions 5 and 6 demonstrate that the essence of our previous analysis remains intact when
we allow for plausible non-linear taxation policies. At most, progressivity may increase the extent
of concavity in f required for the POUM mechanism to be e¤ective.21 Note also that all previous
results comparing complete redistribution and laissez–faire (Tprog(y) ´ y; Treg(y) ´ 0), or more
generally two linear schemes with di¤erent marginal rates, immediately obtain as special cases.
5 Measuring POUM in the Data
The main objective of this paper was to determine whether the POUM hypothesis is theoretically
sound, in spite of its apparently paradoxical nature. As we have seen, the answer is a¢rmative.
The next question which naturally arises is whether the POUM e¤ect is present in the actual data,
and if so, whether it is large enough to matter for redistributive politics.
Our purpose here is not to carry out a large–scale empirical study or detailed calibration, but
to show how the POUM e¤ect can be measured quite simply from income mobility and inequality
data. We shall again start with the benchmark case of risk–neutral agents, then introduce risk–
aversion. The …rst question that we ask is thus the following: at any given horizon, what is the
proportion of agents who have expected future incomes strictly above the mean? In particular, does
it increase with the length of the forecast horizon, and does it eventually rise above 50%? 22
Rather than impose a speci…c functional form on the income process, we shall use here the
more ‡exible description provided by empirical mobility matrices. These are often estimated for
transitions between income quintiles, which is too coarse a grid for our purposes, especially around
the median. We shall therefore use the more disaggregated data compiled by Hungerford (1993)
from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID), namely:
(a) interdecile mobility matrices for the periods 1969–1976 and 1979–1986, denoted M7669 and
M8679 respectively. Each of those is in fact computed in two di¤erent ways: using the straight data
on annual family incomes, and using …ve–year averages centered on the …rst and last years of the
transition period, so as to reduce measurement error.
(b) mean income for each decile, in 1969 and 1979. We shall treat each decile as homogenous,
and denote the vectors of relative incomes as a69 and a79: A “prime” will denote transposition.
21Recall that Propositions 5 and 6 provide su¢cient conditions for y¤f < ¹F0 · yF0 : They are thus probably
stronger than actually necessary, especially for the basic POUM result, which is only that y¤f < yF0 :
22Recall that there is no reason a priori (i.e., absent some concavity in the transition function) why either e¤ect
should be observed in the data, since these are not general features of stationary processes. Rather than just “mean–
reverting”, the expected income dynamics must be “mean–crossing from below” over some range, as in Figure 2.
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Let us start by examining these two income distributions:
a069 = (:211 :410 :566 :696 :822 :947 1:104 1:302 1:549 2:393) ;
a079 = (:179 :358 :523 :669 :801 :933 1:084 1:289 1:588 2:576) :
In both years the median group earned approximately 80% of mean income, while those with the
average level of resources were located somewhere between the 60th and 70th percentiles. More
precisely, by linear interpolation we can estimate the size of the redistributive coalition to be 63:4%
in 1969 and 64:4% in 1979.
Next, we apply the appropriate empirical transition matrix to compute the vector of condition-
ally expected relative incomes t £ 7 years ahead, namely ¡M7669 ¢t ¢ a69 or ¡M8679 ¢t ¢ a79; for t = 1; :::3:
The estimated rank of the cuto¤ y¤ft where expected future income equals the population mean
is then obtained by linear interpolation of these decile values. By iterating a 7–year transition
matrix to compute mobility over 14 and 21 years we are, once again, treating the transition pro-
cess as stationary. Similarly, by using the initial income distribution vectors we are abstracting
from changes in the deciles’ relative incomes during the transition period. These are obviously
simplifying approximations, imposed by the limitations of the data.23
The results, presented in Table 2a, are consistent across all speci…cations: the POUM e¤ect
appears to be a real feature of the process of socioeconomic mobility in the United States –even at
relatively short horizons, but especially over longer ones.24 It a¤ects approximately 3:5% of the
population over 7 years, and 10% over 14 years. This is far from negligible, especially since the
di¤erentials rates of political participation according to socioeconomic class observed in the U.S.
imply that the pivotal agent is almost surely located above the 55th percentile, and probably above
the 60th.25 Over a horizon of approximately 20 years mobility prospects o¤set the entire 13-15%
point interval between mean and median incomes, so that if agents are risk–neutral a strict majority
will oppose such long–run redistributions. Thus, in both 1969 and 1979, 64% of the population
was poorer than average in terms of current income, and yet 51% could rationally see themselves
as richer than average in terms of expected income two decades down the road.
Upwards mobility prospects for the poor, however, represent only one of the forces which deter-
23As a basic robustness check, we used the composite matrix M7669 ¢M8679 to recompute the 14 year transitions. We
also apply the transition matrices M7669 , M7669 ¢M8679 and relevant iterates to the income distribution a79 instead of a69:
The results (not reported here) did not change.
24Tracing the e¤ect back to its source, one can also examine to what extent expected future income is concave in
current income. The expected transition is in fact concave over most, but not all, of its domain: of the nine slopes
de…ned by the ten decile values, only three are larger than their predecessor when we use (M7669 ; a69), and only two
when we use (M8679 ; a79): Recall that while concavity at every point is always a su¢cient condition for the POUM
e¤ect, it is a necessary one only if one requires y¤f < ¹F0 to hold for any initial F0: For a given initial distribution,
such as the one observed in the data, there must be simply “enough” concavity on average, so that Jensen’s inequality
is satis…ed. This is clearly the situation encountered here.
25Using data on how the main forms of political participation (voting, trying to in‡uence others, contributing
money, participating in meetings and campaigns, etc.) vary with income and education, Bénabou (2000) computes
the resulting bias with respect to the median. It is found to vary between 6% for voting propensities and 24% for
propensities to contribute money, with most values being above 10%:
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mine the equilibrium rate of redistribution –alongside with deadweight losses, the political system,
and especially risk–aversion, which was seen to work in the opposite direction. The second ques-
tion we consider is therefore how the POUM e¤ect compares in magnitude to the demand for social
insurance. To that end, let us now assume that agents have constant–relative risk–aversion ¯ > 0:
Using the same procedure and horizons of t £ 7 years as before, we now compare each decile’s ex-
pected utility under laissez–faire to the utility of receiving the mean income for sure. The threshold
where they coincide is again computed by linear interpolation. The results, presented in Tables 2b
to 2d, indicate that even small amounts of risk–aversion will dominate upwards mobility prospects
in the expected utility calculations of the middle class. Beyond values of about ¯ = 0:25 the thresh-
old ceases to decrease with T , becoming instead either U–shaped or even monotonically increasing.
Our …ndings can thus be summarized as follows:
(a) a sizeable fraction of the middle class can rationally look forward to expected incomes that
rise above average over a horizon of 10 to 20 years;
(b) on the other hand, these expected income gains are small enough, compared to the risks
of downward mobility or stagnation, that they are not likely to have a signi…cant impact on the
political outcome, unless voters have very low risk aversion and discount rates.
Being drawn from such a limited empirical exercise, these conclusions should of course be taken
with caution. A …rst concern might be measurement error in the PSID data underlying Hungerford’s
(1979) mobility tables. The use of family income rather than individual earnings, and the fact that
replacing yearly incomes with …ve–year averages does not a¤ect our results, suggest that this is
probably not a major problem. A second caveat is that the data obviously pertain to a particular
country, namely the United states, and a particular period. One may note, on the other hand,
that the two sample periods 1969–1976 and 1979–1986 witnessed very di¤erent evolutions in the
distribution of incomes (relatively stable inequality in the …rst, exploding inequality in the second),
yet lead to very similar results. Still, things might well be di¤erent elsewhere, such as in a developing
economy on its transition path. Finally, there is our compounding the 7–year mobility matrices to
obtain forecasts at longer horizons. This was dictated by the lack of su¢ciently detailed data on
longer transitions, but may well presume too much stationarity in families’ income trajectories.
The above exercise should thus be taken as representing only a …rst pass at testing for the POUM
e¤ect in actual mobility data. More empirical work will hopefully follow, using di¤erent and/or
better data to further investigate the issue of how people’s subjective and, especially, objective
income prospects relate to their attitudes vis–a–vis redistribution. Ravallion and Lokshin (1999)
and Graham and Pettinato (1999) are recent examples based on survey data from post-transition
Russia and post–reform Latin American countries, respectively. Both studies …nd a signi…cant
correlation between (self–assessed) mobility prospects and attitudes towards laissez–faire versus
redistribution.
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6 Conclusion
In spite of its apparently overoptimistic ‡avor, the “prospect of upward mobility” hypothesis often
encountered in discussions of the political economy of redistribution is perfectly compatible with
rational expectations, and fundamentally linked to an intuitive feature of the income mobility
process, namely concavity. Voters poorer than average may nonetheless opt for a low tax rate if the
policy choice bears su¢ciently on future income, and if the latter’s expectation is a concave function
of current income. The political coalition in favor of redistribution is smaller, the more concave
the expected transition function, the longer the duration of the proposed tax scheme, and the more
farsighted the voters. The POUM mechanism is, however, subject to several important limitations.
First, there must be su¢cient inertia or commitment power in the choice of …scal policy, governing
parties or institutions. Second, the other potential sources of curvature in voters’ problem, namely
risk–aversion and non–linearities in the tax system, must not be too large compared to the concavity
of the transition function.
With the theoretical puzzle resolved, the issue now becomes an empirical one, namely whether
the POUM e¤ect is large enough to signi…cantly a¤ect the political equilibrium. We made a …rst
pass at this question and found that this e¤ect is indeed present in the US mobility data, but
likely to be dominated by the value of redistribution as social insurance, unless voters have very
low degrees of risk aversion. Due to the limitations inherent in this simple exercise, however, only
more detailed empirical work on mobility prospects (in the US and other countries) will provide a
de…nite answer.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
By using Jensen’s inequality, we observe that f Â g implies
f(y¤f ) =
Z
X
f dF0 =
Z
X
h(g) dF0 < h
µZ
X
g dF0
¶
= h(g(y¤g)) = f(yg)
for some h 2 T : The proposition follows from the fact that f is strictly increasing. k
Proof of Theorem 1
Let F0 2 F+; so that the median mF0 is below the mean ¹F0 : More generally, we shall be interested
in any income cuto¤ ´ < ¹F0 : Therefore, de…ne for any ® 2 [0; 1] and any ´ 2 (0; ¹F0), the function
g´;®(y) ´ minfy; ´ + ®(y ¡ ´)g; (A.1)
which clearly is an element of T : It is clear thatZ
X
g´;0 dF0 < ´ < ¹F0 =
Z
X
g´;1 dF0;
so by continuity there exists a unique ®(´) 2 (0; 1) which solves:Z
X
g´;®(´) dF0 = ´ (A.2)
Finally, let f = g´;®(´); so that ¹F1 = ´ by (A.2). Adding the constant ¹F0 ¡ ´ to the function f
so as to normalize ¹F1 = ¹F0 would of course not alter any of what follows. It is clear from (A.1)
that everyone with y < ´ prefers r0 to r1; while the reverse is true for everyone with y > ´; so
y¤f = ´: By Proposition 2, therefore, the fraction of agents who support redistribution is greater
(respectively, smaller) than F (´) for all f 2 T which are more (respectively, less) concave than f:
In particular, choosing ´ = mF0 < ¹F0 yields the claimed results for majority voting. k
Proof of Theorem 2
For each t = 1; :::; T; f t 2 T , so by Proposition 1 there is a unique y¤ft 2 (0; ¹F ) such that
f t(y¤ft) = ¹Ft : Moreover, since fT Â fT¡1 Â ¢ ¢ ¢ Â f; Proposition 2 implies that y¤fT < y¤fT¡1 <
¢ ¢ ¢ < y¤f < y¤f0 ´ ¹F0 : The concavity of f also implies f(¹Ft) > ¹Ft+1 for all t, from which it follows
by a simple induction that
f t(¹F0) ¸ ¹Ft = f t(y¤ft) (A.3)
with strict inequality for t > 1 and t < T respectively. Let us now de…ne the operators V T : T ! T
and WT : T ! R as follows:
V T (f) ´
TX
t=0
±tf t and WT (f) ´
Z
X
V T (f)dF0 =
TX
t=0
±t¹Ft : (A.4)
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Agent y achieves utility V T (f)(y) under “laissez-faire”, and utility WT (f) under the redistribu-
tive policy. Moreover, (A.3) implies that
V T (f)(¹F0) =
TX
t=0
±tf t(¹F0) >
TX
t=0
±t¹Ft >
TX
t=0
±tf t(y¤ft) = V T (f)(y¤fT )
for any T ¸ 1: Since V T (f)(¢) is clearly continuous and increasing, there must therefore exist a
unique y¤f (T ) 2 (yfT ; ¹F0) such that
V T (f)(y¤f (T )) =
TX
t=0
±t¹Ft = W
T (f): (A.5)
But since y¤fT+1 < y
¤
fT ; we have y
¤
fT+1 < y
¤
f (T ): This implies that ¹FT+1 = f
T+1(y¤fT+1) <
fT+1(y¤f (T )), and hence
V T+1(f)(y¤f (T )) =
T+1X
t=0
±tf t(y¤f (T )) >
T+1X
t=0
±t¹Ft = V
T+1(f)(y¤f (T + 1)):
Therefore, y¤f (T +1) < y¤f (T ) must hold. By induction, we conclude that y¤f (T 0) < y¤f (T ) whenever
T 0 > T ; part (a) of the theorem is proved.
To prove part (b), we shall use again the family of piecewise linear functions g´;® de…ned in
(A.1). Let us …rst observe that the t–th iterate of g´;® is simply:
(g´;®)t(y) ´ minfy; ´ + ®t(y ¡ ´)g = g´;®t(y): (A.6)
In particular, both g´;1 : y 7! y and g´;0 : y 7! minfy; ´g are idempotent. Therefore:
V T (g´;1)(´) =
TX
t=0
±t´ <
TX
t=0
±t¹F0 = W
T (g´;1):
On the other hand, when the transition function is g´;0, the voter with initial income ´ prefers r0
(under which she receives ´ in each period) to r1; if and only if
´ +
TX
t=1
±t´ = V T (g´;0)(´) > WT (g´;0) = ¹F0 +
TX
t=1
±t
Z
X
minfy; ´gdF0;
or equivalently
¹F0 ¡ ´
´ ¡ RX minfy; ´gdF0 <
TX
t=1
±t =
±(1 ¡ ±T )
1 ¡ ± : (A.7)
This last inequality is clearly satis…ed for (±; 1=T ) close enough to (1; 0): In that case, we have
WT (g´;1) >
PT
t=0 ±
t´ > WT (g´;0): Next, it is clear from (A.4) and (A.1) that WT (g´;®) is continuous
and strictly increasing in ®: Therefore, there exists a unique ®(´) 2 (0; 1) such that WT (g´;®(´)) =
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PT
t=0 ±
t´: This means that, under the transition function f ´ g´;®(´); we have
WT (f) =
TX
t=0
±tf t(´) = V T (f)(´);
so that an agent with initial income ´ is just indi¤erent between receiving her “laissez–faire” income
stream, equal to ´ in every period, and the stream of mean incomes ¹Ft : Moreover, under “laissez–
faire” an agent with initial y < ´ receives y in every period, while an agent with y > ´ receives
´ +®t(y ¡ ´) > ´: Therefore, ´ is the cuto¤ y¤f (T ) separating those who support r0 from those who
support r1; given f ´ g´;®(´): This proves the …rst statement in part (b) of the theorem.
Finally, by part (a) of the theorem, increasing (decreasing) the horizon T will reduce (raise) the
cuto¤ y¤f (T ) below (above) ´: Applying these results to the particular choice of a cuto¤ equal to
median income, ´ ´ mF0 ; completes the proof.k
Proof of Theorem 3
As in the proof Theorem 1, let F0 2 F+ and consider any income cuto¤ ´ < ¹F0 : Recall the function
g´;®(´)(y) which was de…ned by (A.1) and (A.2) so as to ensure that ¹F1 = ´: (Once again, adding
any positive constant to f would not change anything). For brevity, we shall now denote ®(´) and
g´;®(´) as just ® and g: Let us now construct a stochastic transition function whose expectation
is g and which, together with F0, results in a positively skewed F1: Let p 2 (0; 1) and let £ be a
random variable taking values 0 and 1 with probabilities p and 1 ¡ p: For any " 2 (0; ´), we de…ne
f : X £ - ! R+ as follows:
² if 0 · y · ´ ¡ "; f(y; µ) ´ y for all µ
² if ´ ¡ " < y · ´; f(y; µ) ´
8<: ´ ¡ "y ¡ p(´ ¡ ")
1 ¡ p
if µ = 0
if µ = 1
( probability p)
( probability 1 ¡ p)
² if ´ · y · ¹y; f(y; µ) ´
8<: ´ ¡ "´ + ®(y ¡ ´) + p"
1 ¡ p
if µ = 0
if µ = 1
( probability p)
( probability 1 ¡ p)
By construction, E£ [f(y;£)] = g(y) for all y 2 X; therefore, E£ [f(¢ ;£)] = g 2 T : It remains
to be checked that f(y;£) is strictly stochastically increasing in y. In other words, for any x 2 X;
the conditional distribution M(xjy) ´ P (fµ 2 - j f(y; µ) · xg) must be decreasing in y on X, and
strictly increasing on a nonempty subinterval of X: But this is equivalent to saying that
R
X h(x)
dM(xjy) must be (strictly) increasing in y; for any (strictly) increasing function h : X ! R; this
latter form of the property is easily veri…ed from the above de…nition of f(y; µ):
Because E£ [f(¢ ; £)] = g, so that ¹F1 = ´ by (A.2), the cuto¤ between the agents who prefer
r0 and those who prefer r1 is y¤f = ´: This tipping point can be set to any value below ¹F0 (i.e.,
1 ¡ F0(´) can be made arbitrarily small), while simultaneously ensuring that F1(¹F1) > ¾: Indeed,
F1(¹F1) = F1(´) = p
Z
X
1fx:f(x;0)·´gdF0(x) + (1 ¡ p)
Z
X
1fx:f(x;1)·´gdF0(x) = p + (1 ¡ p)F0(´ ¡ p");
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so by choosing p close to 1 this expression can be made arbitrarily close to 1; for any given ´:
To conclude the proof it only remains to observe that a transition function f¤ 2 T is more
concave than f in expectation if and only if E£[f¤(¢ ; £)] Â E£[f(¢ ; £)] = g: Proposition 2 then
implies that the fraction of agents who support redistribution under f¤ is greater than F0(´): The
reverse inequalities hold whenever f ÂP f¤. As before, choosing the particular cuto¤ ´ = mF < ¹F
yields the claimed results pertaining to majority voting, for any distribution F0 2 F+: k
Proof of Proposition 4
De…ne ht ´ E£1¢ ¢ ¢E£tf t(¢ ;£1; :::; £t); t = 1; :::, and observe that ht 2 T and ht+1 Â ht for all t
under the hypotheses of the proposition. The proof is thus identical to part (a) of Theorem 2, with
ht playing the role of f t: k
Proof of Proposition 5
1) Properties of yF0 . By the mean value theorem, there exists a point yF0 2 X such that
(Tprog ¡ Treg)(yF0) =
Z
X
(Tprog ¡ Treg)dF0; (A.8)
which by (10) means that rprog(yF0) = rreg(yF0): Now, since Tprog¡Treg is convex, Jensen’s inequality
allows us to write:
(Tprog ¡ Treg)(¹F0) ·
Z
X
(Tprog ¡ Treg)dF0 = (Tprog ¡ Treg)(yF0): (A.9)
With (Tprog ¡ Treg)0 (0) ¸ 0, the convexity of Tprog¡Treg implies that it is a non–decreasing function
on [0; ¹y]: In the trivial case where it is identically zero, indi¤erence obtains at every point, so choosing
yF = ¹F0 immediately yields the results. Otherwise, two cases are possible. Either Tprog ¡ Treg is
a strictly increasing linear function; or else it is convex (not a¢ne) on some subinterval, implying
that the inequality in (A.9) is strict. Under either scenario (A.8) implies that yF0 is the unique
cuto¤ point between the supporters of the two (static) policies, and (A.9) requires that yF0 ¸ ¹F0 :
2) Properties of y¤f : By the mean value theorem, there exists a point y¤f 2 X such that
E£
£
(Tprog ¡ Treg)(f(y¤f ;£))
¤
=
Z
X
E£ [(Tprog ¡ Treg)(f(y;£))] dF0(y); (A.10)
or equivalently E£
h
rprog(f(y¤f ;£))
i
= E£
h
rreg(f(y¤f ;£))
i
: Moreover:Z
X
E£ [(Tprog ¡ Treg)(f(y; £))] dF0(y) < E£ £(Tprog ¡ Treg)(f(¹F0 ;£))¤ ; (A.11)
by Jensen’s inequality for the concave (not a¢ne) function E£[(Tprog ¡Treg)±f(¢; £)]: This function
is also non–decreasing, since Tprog ¡Treg has this property and f 2 T P is increasing in y with prob-
ability one. Therefore y¤f is indeed the cuto¤ point such that E£ [rprog(f(y; £))] ? E£ [rreg(f(y; £)]
as y 7 y¤f ; and moreover (A.11) requires that ¹F0 > y¤f :k
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Proof of Proposition 6
1) Properties of yF . The proofs of (A.8) and (A.9) proceed as above, except that the right–hand
side of (A.8) is now equal to zero due to the equal–revenue constraint. Since Tprog ¡Treg is convex,
equal to zero at y = 0; and has a zero integral, is must be (barring again the trivial case where
it is zero everywhere) that it is …rst negative on (0; yF ); then positive on (yF ; ¹y): Therefore yF is
indeed the threshold such that rprog(y) ? rreg(y) as y 7 yF , and moreover by (A.8) it must be that
¹F · yF :
2) Properties of y¤f : Since the distribution F is, by de…nition, invariant under the mobility
process (f; P ), so is the revenue raised by either tax scheme. This implies that the function
E£
h
(Tprog ¡ Treg)(f(y¤f ;£))
i
; like Tprog ¡ Treg, sums to zero over [0; ¹y] :Z
X
E£ [(Tprog ¡ Treg)(f(y;£))] dF (y) =
Z
X
Z
-
(Tprog ¡ Treg)(f(y; µ))dF (y)dP (µ)
=
Z
X
(Tprog ¡ Treg)(x)dF (x) = 0: (A.12)
Therefore, by the mean value theorem there is at least one point y¤f where
E£
£
(Tprog ¡ Treg)(f(y¤f ;£))
¤
= 0:
Furthermore, since this same function is concave (not a¢ne), Jensen’s inequality implies:
E£ [(Tprog ¡ Treg)(f(¹F ;£))] >
Z
X
E£ [(Tprog ¡ Treg)(f(y;£)) dF (y)] = 0: (A.13)
Finally, observe that since the function E£ [(rprog ¡ rreg)(f(¢; £))] is convex (not a¢ne) on [0; ¹y],
equal to zero at y¤f and non–negative at the right boundary ¹y; it must be …rst negative on
(0; y¤f ); then positive on (y¤f ; ¹y): Therefore y¤f is indeed the unique tipping point, meaning that
E£ [rprog(f(y;£))] ? E£ [rreg(f(y; £))] as y 7 y¤f ; moreover, by (A.13) we must have ¹F > y¤f :k
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.Data (1990 ) Model 1 Model 2
Median family income $ 35,353 36; 000 35; 000
Mean family income $ 42,652 41; 872 42; 260
Standard deviation of family incomes $ 29,203 28; 138 27; 499
Share of bottom 100 ¤ ¼1 = 33% of population % 11.62 12:82 ¡
Share of middle 100 ¤ ¼2 = 44% of population % 39.36 37:46 ¡
Share of top 100 ¤ ¼3 = 24% of population % 49.02 49:72 ¡
Share of bottom 100 ¤ ¼1% = 39% of population % 14.86 ¡ 18:5
Share of middle 100 ¤ ¼2% = 37% of population % 36.12 ¡ 30:8
Share of top 100 ¤ ¼3% = 24% of population % 49.02 ¡ 50:8
Intergenerational correlation of log–incomes % 0:35 to 0:55 : 45: 0:51
Table 1: Distribution and Persistence of Income in the United States a
0a Sources: median and mean income are from the 1990 US Census (Table F-5). The shares presented here are
obtained by linear interpolation from the shares of the …ve quintiles (respectively 4.6, 10.8, 16.6, 23.8, and 44.3
percent) given for 1990 by the US Census Bureau (Income Inequality Table 1). The variance is computed from the
average income levels of each quintile in 1990 (Table F–3). Estimates of the intergenerational correlation from PSID
or NLS data are provided by Solon (1992), Zimmerman, (1992) and Mulligan (1995), among others.
Horizon (years)
Mobility Matrix 0 7 14 21
1969–1976 %
Annual incomes 63: 39 61: 83 54: 22 48: 77
Five–year averages 63: 39 60: 77 56: 36 52: 91
1979–1986 %
Annual incomes 64: 42 60: 90 51: 31 48: 11
Five–year averages 64: 42 58: 80 54: 29 51: 43
Table 2a: Income Percentile of the Political Cuto¤, risk–neutral agents
Horizon (years)
Mobility Matrix 0 7 14 21
1979–1986 %
Annual incomes 64: 42 61: 70 56: 62 52: 98
Five–year averages 64: 42 59: 40 55: 59 53: 60
1969–1976 %
Annual incomes 63: 39 62: 46 60: 75 60: 20
Five–year averages 63: 39 61: 42 58: 53 56: 49
Table 2b: Income Percentile of the Political Cuto¤, risk–aversion = 0.10
Horizon (years)
Mobility Matrix 0 7 14 21
1979–1986 %
Annual incomes 64: 42 63: 01 62: 02 64: 42
Five–year averages 64: 42 60: 31 57: 56 56: 93
1969–1976 %
Annual incomes 63: 39 63: 44 63: 21 65: 00
Five–year averages 63: 39 62: 43 61: 33 61: 54
Table 2c: Income Percentile of the Political Cuto¤, risk–aversion = 0.25
Horizon (years)
Mobility Matrix 0 7 14 21
1979–1986 %
Annual incomes 64: 42 65: 46 67: 92 73: 29
Five–year averages 64: 42 62: 01 61: 31 64: 27
1969–1976 %
Annual incomes 63: 39 65: 10 67: 32 81: 28
Five–year averages 63: 39 64: 29 65: 63 69: 09
Table 2d: Income Percentile of the Political Cuto¤, risk–aversion = 0.50


